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Abstract 
Over the past three decades, many nations accelerated their efforts to develop 
academic research commercialisation to help drive their innovation and productivity goals. 
Despite failure to achieve the desired results, surprisingly very few studies have examined 
how research commercialisation initiatives are designed at the government level. This study 
reviews the historical role of the government and the interplay between significant shifts in 
research direction, funding and accounting that contributed to the development of academic 
research commercialisation in New Zealand. The paper concludes that funding pressures 
combined with the government’s lack of early recognition and formal endorsement of 
research commercialisation as a vital activity has contributed to previous low levels of 
academic research commercialisation. The important lessons to be learnt from the New 
Zealand case are that academic research commercialisation requires a coherent long-term 
national strategy that is responsive, promises results and has funding incentives.  
Keywords: Academic research commercialisation, accounting, government, new public 
management, innovation. 
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Introduction 
Universities are often viewed as rich reservoirs of unexploited commercialisable 
intellectual property (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis, 2001; Rosenberg and Nelson, 
1994) that put them at the centre stage of creation and diffusion of new knowledge 
considered essential in driving the innovation and economic development plans of many 
nations (OECD, 2008; Rasmussen, Moen, and Gulbrandsen, 2006). In the United States, 
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 to ensure the USA’s competitiveness in the 
world economy and universities were given a central role in the commercialisation of 
research to help drive the nation’s innovation and productivity goals. Since then, a number of 
government initiatives have been taken in many countries, especially in the UK (HM 
Treasury, 2004), across Europe (Commission of the European Communities [COM], 2003), 
and Canada (AUCC, 2001), to recognise and enhance universities’ engagement in 
commercialisation of academic research.  
Despite the broad acceptance by governments around the world of the importance of 
research commercialisation (Nordfors, Sandred, and Wessner, 2003) and its contribution to 
economic performance (Dahlstrand, 2008; Lindelof and Lofsten, 2003; Lofsten and Lindelof, 
2002), many nations lagged behind in terms of academic research commercialisation 
(Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003). There is accumulating evidence that previous government 
policies failed to achieve the desired results in the form of economic growth and knowledge 
transfer to industry (Dahlstrand, 2008; Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003). Surprisingly, very 
few studies examined the role of the government and how initiatives are designed at the 
government level to achieve the intended research commercialisation objectives (Rasmussen, 
2008). 
This paper provides a New Zealand case study that contributes to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the role of the government and the use of accounting in the 
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development of academic research commercialisation. It is intended that this historical 
research will help explain why previous government policies failed to achieve the desired 
research commercialisation results and what lessons can be learnt from the New Zealand 
experience. The acquiring of resources and financial incentives are necessary components of 
research commercialisation development. However, the interplay between significant shifts in 
research policy direction, funding, and associated links with accounting and accountability 
mechanisms to facilitate research commercialisation is not well understood. Accounting is 
best understood in the contexts in which it operates, and rather than being perceived as a 
mere technical practice, accounting is increasingly perceived as a social practice (Carnegie 
and Napier, 1996; Miller, 1994; Potter, 2005). Hence, it is important to examine the use of 
accounting through different political agendas (Hopwood, 2005) to “demonstrate an 
appreciation” for its “pervasive and enabling characteristics” (Potter, 2005, p. 265).  
The New Zealand case is particularly interesting for several reasons. The government 
is a significant player in the nation’s innovation system and sees commercialisation of 
research as an important way to create benefits for New Zealand. It put innovation at the 
centre of its economic policy and established various science and innovation-related 
mechanisms aimed at strengthening the innovative efforts of the nation. The government 
finances about half the country’s investment in research, science and technology, owns 
research infrastructure, notably, Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) and is committed to 
supporting commercialisation of research activities (MoRST, 2006). It relies on the tertiary 
education system to produce knowledge, skills and innovation to transform the economy and 
give effect to its vision on academic research commercialisation (TEAC, 2001a). The 
government provides the strategic direction and formulates research priorities for tertiary 
institutions. In return for the public investment in research for tertiary institutions, the 
government has been seeking enhanced commercialisation and rapid diffusion of new ideas 
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and technologies into all sectors of the economy (MoRST, 2006). Despite the efforts of the 
government, the performance of the nation’s innovation system failed to keep pace with other 
developed countries. New Zealand continues to lag behind in terms of the gross domestic 
product per capita (OECD, 2007) and ranks towards the bottom end of the OECD 
productivity league (OECD, 2009). Although tertiary institutions produce significant amounts 
of research, there is a strikingly low rate of transfer to business (Ministry of Education, 
2003). 
Information for this study was obtained from a review of literature and archival 
sources of data including the government reform reports and research policy documents. 
Accompanying legislative framework and research funding mechanisms were also examined. 
The focus of this paper is on research in general, since basic research funding for tertiary 
institutions is performance based with an emphasis on research quality, as opposed to 
research disciplines. In order to get an in-depth understanding of the government policy 
initiatives, a total of ten face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with well-
informed persons such as government policy advisors, senior academic researchers, 
university policy makers, research commercialisation managers and chief executives. The 
case description was written based on collected material and sources verified by interviewees. 
The study utilises neo-liberalism and new public management (NPM) ideologies as 
appropriate theoretical perspectives for analysis. It is within this theoretical framework that 
major public sector transformations took place across many nations including New Zealand.  
The paper continues with an outline of neo-liberalism and NPM theoretical 
perspectives that informs the study. Next, it provides a historical overview of the government 
reform agenda on research commercialisation. It then presents the reforms of the tertiary 
sector and the government’s vision on academic research commercialisation. Within these 
contexts, the interplay between significant shifts in research policy direction and funding and 
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the pervasive and enabling characteristics of accounting in influencing the development of 
research commercialisation is also examined. The paper concludes with an assessment of the 
role of the government and provides important lessons to be learnt from the New Zealand 
experience.  
Neo-liberalism and NPM perspectives 
Neo-liberalism became globally accepted as a set of political and economic discourses 
necessary to restructure and reconstitute essential public sector services as part of the 
competitive realities of the market (Davies, Gottsche, and Bansel, 2006; Harvey, 2005; 
Peters, 2006). The underlying policy framework of neo-liberalism is marked by a shift from 
Keynesian welfarism towards a political economy theory favouring market mechanisms as a 
means of ensuring societal well-being (Larner, 2000). The superiority of the market forces 
with its association with free trade, international competition, economic efficiency and 
consumer choice is seen as a better way of transforming government activity (Butterworth 
and Butterworth, 1998; McKenna, 2000). Neo-liberalism embraces the philosophy of 
globalisation, deregulation, privatisation and minimal involvement of government in the 
direct provision of public services (Larner, 2000). According to Clarke (1997), neo-liberalism 
disintegrated the conceptions of the public as a collective identity by attempting to substitute 
individualised and economised identities as taxpayers and consumers. Thus, neo-liberal 
strategies encouraged individual entrepreneurship that privileges private property 
accumulation co-ordinated by markets (Harvey, 2005). This means that competition and 
consumer demand supplanted the norms of public service with each individual becoming 
responsible for enhancing their own well being by exercising autonomous choices. Through 
the lens of governmentality, neo-liberalism encouraged the framing of public expenditure in 
terms of what the government could afford (Clarke, 2004). It promoted technologies such as 
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budget disciplines, accounting, and audit as useful mechanisms of public sector governance 
(Olssen and Peters, 2005). 
In the transformation of public sector organisations, neo-liberalism has been 
expressed through NPM practices (Servage, 2009).  NPM can be best understood as an 
ideological configuration of neo-liberal strategies that emphasise individual rights, market 
freedom and competition in achieving the overall economic well being of the society (Olssen, 
2002). By advocating the use of markets and market driven changes in the organisation and 
management of the public sector, NPM defined new forms of administrative orthodoxy about 
how public services are run and regulated (Deem and Brehony, 2005). It introduces the 
entrepreneurial spirit to innovate public sector organisations and there is greater reliance on 
private sector ideas and business practices regarded as far superior to the public sector (Hood, 
1995). Some of the main characteristics of NPM include less bureaucracy, devolved 
management, public-private partnerships and the development of quasi-markets for service 
(Olssen, 2002). These are aimed at fostering competition, both internal and external to the 
organisation, in the interests of driving maximum efficiency and effectiveness in the overall 
provision of public service (Deem, 2001). NPM places greater emphasis on accountability as 
a clear assurance that the organisation is operating as efficiently and effectively as possible 
(Hood, 1995; Olssen, 2002). It imposes clear requirements on accountability through the 
inclusion of the widespread use of performance indicators and performance management 
systems, as well as enhanced forms of monitoring and reporting systems to hold the 
organisation and its workers accountable for maximum efficiency (Deem, 2001). The 
underlying dominant themes include comprehensive corporate planning, shift from inputs to 
output and outcome measures, the introduction of performance based remuneration systems 
and letting managers manage through the devolution of management control (Aucoin, 1990; 
Boston, Martin, Pallot, and Walsh, 1991; Deem, 2001; Hood, 1995). 
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 As a consequence of NPM’s call for greater efficiency, effectiveness and 
accountability, the domain of accounting expanded and assumed far greater prominence 
beyond levels previously recognised (Hopwood, 1992; Miller, 1994; Power, 1994). It created 
financial forms of visibility that has implications not only for the functioning of the 
organisation, but also for the society as a whole (Carnegie and Napier, 1996; Miller, 1994; 
Potter, 2005). Hence, accounting is increasingly perceived as a social and institutional 
practice rather than merely a technical practice (Potter, 2005). Within the social and 
institutional paradigm, accounting is a device for intervening in the functioning of 
organisations and societies to help understand activities, processes and the manner in which 
social reality is constructed (Miller, 1994). The NPM ideologies based on efficiency, 
effectiveness, accountability, transparency and autonomy have become institutionalised and 
fairly well established in transforming public sector organisations in global contexts. It 
became increasingly popular in countries such as New Zealand, Britain, Australia, Canada, 
and the United States through its emphasis on a strong social demand for better public 
management (Boston, 1991; Boston, Martin, Pallot, and Walsh, 1996; Deem and Brehony, 
2005; Ferlie, Pettigrew, Ashburner, and Fitzgerald, 1996). The New Zealand experiment 
based on neo-liberalism has been described as the most ambitious attempt in reinventing 
government using NPM ideologies (Gray, 1998). How this influenced the development of 
academic research commercialisation is further analysed in the paper. 
Historical overview of the government reforms – the broader context 
In New Zealand, the origins of the research commercialisation strategy can be traced 
back to the more general reforms of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
(DSIR). The DSIR, established in 1926, was the central authority administered by an 
independent governing council that co-ordinated, funded and supported the research efforts of 
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the government (Galbreath, 1998). In 1935, the DSIR began to undertake more research itself 
resulting in a programme of expansion and centralisation of science and industrial research 
and by 1949 it added eight further research divisions and trebled its staff numbers (Galbreath, 
1998). The DSIR received central funding allocations from the government and relied heavily 
on traditional budgeting as the key accounting mechanism to allocate funding to other public 
research bodies. Accounting, a technical practice privileged with characteristics of neutrality, 
objectivity, calculability and usefulness for decision-making (Gomes, 2008; Miller and 
O'Leary, 1993), enabled both the DSIR and the government to administer and govern in a 
disciplined manner according to budgeted facts. The budget also served as an important 
planning and control mechanism and budget allocations helped determine the research 
agendas and priorities for the DSIR and other government agencies.  
Greater reliance on the budget as a central control mechanism became evident in 1950 
when it helped the government rein in the DSIR’s spending. But then growth continued with 
the expansion of the DSIR’s role into research departments undertaking research in 
competition with other government departments. According to Galbreath (1998), by 1963, the 
DSIR’s council lost its usefulness as a central co-ordinating body for research and was 
replaced by a more independent National Research Advisory Council that administered the 
funding allocations and set separate budgets of the DSIR and other departments, each with its 
own priorities. In 1970, the National Research Advisory Council adopted a more coherent 
policy for national science with an overall science budget. Research policy and planning 
guided by budget formulations allowed for the overall coordination of the government’s 
research agenda.  
The science budget plan, depicted as a successful accounting mechanism, evolved and 
helped construct and facilitate the national scientific effort. In this manner, accounting 
became “intimately implicated in the construction and facilitation of the context” (Hopwood, 
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Burchell, and Clubb, 1994, p. 228) leading to the growth of the DSIR by 5 percent a year and 
its expansion to a total of 2,097 staff and 20 research divisions by 1976 (Galbreath, 1998). 
Following the oil shock of 1973, the government was forced to curb expenditure and from 
1976, the DSIR like all other government departments had controls on expenditure, including 
a requirement to charge for services where possible. This in itself became an interesting 
accounting challenge for the scientists as the characteristics of science and business were 
very different in terms of motivation, purpose and operating values (Edmeades, 2004). The 
charging for services directed attention to ways in which accounting exerted an influence and, 
in turn, became influenced by economic factors (Miller, 1994) thus intensifying the debate on 
research commercialisation. 
Commercialisation of the DSIR  
The transformation or reinvention of the New Zealand public sector began in 1984 
with the election of the fourth Labour Government that initiated sweeping changes (Boston, 
1991) and promised to liberalise the economy by using competitive market forces (Easton, 
1997). With the government intent on relying on the logic of market forces and its economic 
liberalisation policy to transform the nation’s research activity, the DSIR came under 
considerable pressure to become more commercial. In 1984, the government imposed 
expenditure controls and introduced ‘user pays’ policy in the DSIR, not only as a cost 
recovery measure, but also to encourage a customer-contractor approach (Galbreath, 1998). 
The government policy took a firm view that it should not be funding or subsidising research 
of direct commercial value. It also took the hard line approach of cutting funding of the DSIR 
and other research agencies by the amount it considered users should be paying. From 1984-
1988, government funding to the DSIR was progressively reduced by a total of 25 per cent 
which led to the DSIR more actively seeking customers willing to contract for its research 
services (Galbreath, 1998).  
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The commercial model based on the user pays policy presented its own accounting 
challenges in terms of adopting appropriate costing and pricing models. The role of 
accounting expanded to include an understanding of full cost recovery models and pricing 
policies. It required identification of the direct and indirect costs of research. The criteria for 
categorising overhead costs associated with research pricing had to be determined and then 
certain indirect costs attributed to the total cost of research in a more systematic manner. The 
introduction of the user pays policy marked the advent of the NPM reforms allowing the 
logic of market forces to determine where research and development would yield the highest 
commercial returns using the accounting criteria of costing and pricing. The NPM reforms 
also set the research commercialisation agenda that was subject to considerable political 
debate and led to the formation of various working parties to advise the government.  
The research commercialisation debate 
The Treasury supported research commercialisation using an economic argument that 
insisted on letting the markets and the user pays principle decide where research and 
development were likely to yield the maximum returns (Treasury, 1987). The DSIR scientists 
on the other hand argued for government research funding for the good of the nation and its 
economic development priorities (Galbreath, 1998). However, the Treasury economists 
insisted that better economic performance would result from a more competitive economic 
environment by separating the funders and providers, and introducing contestability in 
funding allocations with an emphasis on purchasing outputs rather than funding inputs. To 
the scientists, the economic arguments of the Treasury did not measure up and in an effort to 
convince the Treasury officials of the value of research; the scientists relied on the accounting 
measures of internal rate of return on a number of research projects to determine its value to 
the economy (Galbreath, 1998). Throughout the 1980s, this was the accepted accounting 
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measure and reliance on this technical dimension of accounting was more an effort to seek 
greater legitimacy for funding use.  
While the debate continued over funding issues, gradually the commercial market 
model became accepted by most scientists. As recorded by Devine (2003, p. 70), “the science 
community had itself failed to grasp the significance of the reforms” and some supported it 
for “opportunistic reasons rather than conviction”. By this time the ‘market failure’ argument 
also emerged as a rationale for the government to deliver funding for basic research in the 
long-term interest of research development or where research had social value but was not 
marketable. In 1988, the idea that research should be funded for the ‘public good’ as well as 
for strategic and future economic benefits was recommended by the Science and Technology 
Advisory Committee, the last of a succession of official working parties to recommend on the 
restructuring of science. This working party also recommended the restructuring of science 
along market lines as advocated by the Treasury economists. The government accepted these 
recommendations, and in 1989, a new Ministry of Research, Science and Technology was 
established to provide policy advice to the government. In 1991, the Foundation for Research, 
Science and Technology was established as an independent funding agency to allocate 
government funding for research from the Public Good Science Fund. 
Establishment of the Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) 
 In 1992, the DSIR and other government science providers were restructured into ten 
CRIs to operate as commercial entities established under the Crown Institutes Act 1992. The 
Crown Institutes Act 1992 also abolished the DSIR and other science providers. The 
underlying benefits from this restructuring were identified as the provision of a clearer 
framework for management of all risks, the devolution of operational management decision-
making, wider access to capital and enhanced management accountability (COMU, 2010). 
The primary intention was to encourage efficiency through competition and clear objectives 
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and robust accountabilities with greater transparency and focus (Devine, 2003; Edmeades, 
2004). The CRIs are subject to the Crown Entities Act 2004, the CRI Act 1992 and the 
Companies Act 1993. Each CRI is a registered company with independent board of directors 
appointed by the government. They manage their own resources and there is an expectation 
that the commercial criteria would provide a fair assessment of their managerial performance. 
The primary objective of setting the CRIs as separate companies is to ensure the 
transformation of much of the commercial research into profit-making activities and to create 
a positive shareholder value. This perhaps explains why the tenth CRI responsible for social 
research was subsequently disbanded in August 1995 due to its failure to establish 
commercial viability (COMU, 2010).  
The transformation of the CRIs as commercial entities was greatly assisted by the 
introduction of ‘business accounting’ methods. This was facilitated by the CRI Act which 
required the CRIs to generate, on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles, an 
adequate rate of return on shareholders’ funds (equity) which reflects the cost of that equity. 
According to the Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit, the CRIs have become more market 
focused, exhibit a much stronger and more pervasive strategic focus, and have greater 
performance expectations than the departments from which they were formed (COMU, 
2010). They have become much stronger organisations since the time of their establishment. 
In the year ended June 2009, the CRIs employed in excess of 4,200 staff, and in terms of 
financial performance, reported a collective operating surplus of $25.2 million. Their total 
operating income increased by $28.8 million to $677.9 million and total assets were valued at 
$701.9 million at 30 June 2009, up from $668.7 million at 30 June 2008 (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2009). It is interesting to note that such accounting measures are typical 
performance measurements of a commercially focused business organisation and the role of 
accounting expanded to meet the financial accounting requirements of profitability and 
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shareholder value creation. Accounting not only emerged as a powerful technical practice, it 
was used as an intervening device to help transform the CRIs and address the institutional 
pressures of reforms (Miller, 1994).  
The transformation of the government research organisations based on neo-liberalism 
and NPM ideologies set the commercialisation agenda. It brought market discipline into the 
research efforts of the government. However, the government funding cuts and accounting 
performance measures emphasised revenue and profits that made CRIs chase funds as their 
primary purpose at the expense of a much broader research commercialisation mission 
(Devine, 2003). While this behaviour was a logical response to the governance and funding 
incentives utilised by the government, the strategic and policy directions of the government 
did little to encourage the CRIs to develop research commercialisation and optimise 
contribution to the wider community (Winsley, 2003). The reforms of the DSIR and changes 
in wider research policy set the context for reforms in the tertiary education sector. 
The tertiary education sector reforms 
Period 1980-1989: Setting the reform agenda  
The restructuring of the government research organisations based on neo-liberalism 
set the context for the reform of the tertiary education sector. Prior to the early 1980s, 
education was considered a ‘public good’ that was freely available to all citizens. Education, 
including all research was block grant funded by the government as an important investment 
in building the wealth generating capacity of the nation, as well as making a worthy 
contribution towards the greater good of society. The Hawke Report on post-compulsory 
education and training in New Zealand, published in July 1988, became a significant starting 
point of debate in the commercialisation process of tertiary education (Hawke, 1988). The 
report recommended that universities become more commercial with the ability to generate 
private funds and set their own fees. It also recommended the separation of teaching and 
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research, and the use of contractual forms of accountability through charters and performance 
appraisal systems. Most of the Hawke Report recommendations were incorporated as the 
government’s intended policies in the Learning for Life document (Ministry of Education, 
1989a) with detailed recommendations on the implementation of these policies contained in 
the Learning for Life Two document (Ministry of Education, 1989b). These two documents 
emphasised neo-liberal market policies and maintained a similar commercial approach using 
free market forces to drive the tertiary education sector. The Learning for Life reforms 
resulted in some degree of corporatisation whereby tertiary institutions operated like private 
businesses utilising private-sector management practices (Olssen, 2002). However, while the 
period 1984 – 1989 was that of experimentation with the government withdrawing from 
many areas of economic production in the general public sector, education continued to be 
understood as a social good rather than an economic investment (Larner & Le Heron, 2005).  
First university commercialisation office established 
A significant development in university research commercialisation was in 1988. The 
University of Auckland established UniServices, the first university commercialisation 
company in New Zealand to handle all commercial research contract and consultancy work 
coming out of the university. Hood (2001) argued that public research funding levels for the 
tertiary sector was far too little in comparison to international standards, so in a partial 
response to this problem, UniServices was formed to generate funding for the university to 
help build its research capacity. This important development signalled the introduction of 
research commercialisation in the New Zealand tertiary education sector. Within three years 
of the formation of UniServices, all eight New Zealand universities established varying forms 
of research units and companies to undertake contract research and facilitate the development 
of research commercialisation opportunities. 
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 UniServices was set up as a limited liability subsidiary company with an independent 
board equally split between business and academic members. The commercial nature of its 
operations led to the decoupling of accounting from the university system to avoid 
bureaucratic compliance procedures of NPM and facilitate the adoption of business 
accounting and financial management practices to ensure that the commercial company was 
run as a profitable business. In effect, decoupling enabled accounting to operate in a different 
institutional context, that is, the commercial environment. Success in terms of 
commercialisation reported in the 2009 annual report of the University of Auckland was that 
the annual revenue grew by 17.4 percent to $114 million for 2009 and it provided 
employment for 750 staff and researchers, and sponsored research for an additional 550 
university researchers. There were 200 active patent families and 83 new invention 
disclosures in 2009. In 2008, the New Zealand Vice Chancellors Committee reported that 
universities were at the forefront of commercialising research results and the sector had a 
turnover of $350 million a year. In the four years from 2003-2006, their combined activities 
had a total income of $1.2 billion (New Zealand Vice Chancellors Committee, 2008). 
However, most of the income was generated from consultancy contracts and licence fees, and 
commercialisation of academic research in terms of new product development and 
technology transfer to business remains low (Ministry of Education, 2006a). This is because 
commercialisation is often long-term and requires substantial financial investment with no 
guarantee of outcomes and financial returns. In the absence of government policy and 
funding to support the development of commercialisation projects, many universities have no 
desire to risk their involvement and investment. In addition, with revenue targets widely 
recognised as a critical measure of commercialisation performance, it seems logical for 
universities to chase consultancy and research contracts that provide a guaranteed income.   
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Period 1990-1999: The influence of neo-liberalism and NPM 
In addition to the institutional and funding pressures that led to the establishment of 
university commercialisation structures, the influence of neo-liberalism set the policy agenda 
for exposing tertiary institutions to commercialisation using market forces. Under neo-
liberalism, education was reconstituted as an essential service or product to be traded in the 
marketplace (Davies et al., 2006; Peters, 1999). Neo-liberal strategies based on market 
principles of economic efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, transparency, autonomy 
and contestability largely influenced the development of education policy decisions. It also 
marked the implementation of NPM reforms with an emphasis on enhanced financial 
accountability and reporting requirements. 
 In 1990, the Learning for Life Two document was implemented. The 1990 Education 
Amendment Act provided the legislative framework for tertiary institutions to operate as 
autonomous and economically efficient ‘businesses’ with the introduction of bulk grants for 
teaching and research. Each tertiary institution was granted institutional autonomy with their 
own governing council that operated on a contractual model of accountability through 
charters, mission statements and performance objectives. To give effect to these new 
accountability and performance reporting requirements, major public sector accounting 
changes were implemented within the legislative framework of the Public Finance Act 1989. 
The tertiary institutions’ financial statements were remodelled in terms of statements of 
objectives and statements of service performance, and annual reports became the key 
accountability document used to report to the government and other stakeholders on 
performance. Changes to the funding system were made with a mix of student fees and 
government loans as well as a separation of teaching and research with some innovation and 
science related research funding becoming more contestable. This was to ensure that the 
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requirements for advanced high quality research portfolios with a strong strategic focus were 
met.  
The tertiary institutions were encouraged to become more commercial with the 
freedom to generate private sources of revenue and set their own fees to supplement 
simultaneous reduction in bulk grants (Easton, 1997; Olssen, 2002). Commercialisation was 
facilitated by the implementation of significant accounting changes that included course 
costing and pricing mechanisms, programme budgeting and enhanced financial reporting 
systems. The role of accounting was expanded to include an understanding of full cost 
recovery models and pricing policies, identification of direct and indirect costs and 
establishment of the accounting criteria for categorising overhead costs associated with 
research and pricing of research projects. The nature of all costs required proper identification 
and recording in the accounts, and certain indirect costs attributed to the total cost of research 
and individual research projects required allocation to ensure pricing was done in a 
systematic manner.  
The implementation of the calculative practices of accounting helped transform the 
tertiary institutions (Miller, 1994). Greater reliance on accounting and pricing methods 
facilitated the substantial increase in research funding generated from various private sources. 
The university generated research funds, including the student fee component, more than 
doubled from $46.8 million in 1992/1993 to $115.7 million in 1997/1998 (Johnson, 2000). 
The administrative reforms of the research sector, with the establishment of the Ministry of 
Research, Science and Technology and the Foundation for Research, Science and 
Technology, propelled fiscal conservatism on the part of the government to change the set of 
incentives that faced research funders and providers in order to bring about greater 
accountability, efficiency and private participation (Johnson, 2000). The 1990s saw a greater 
flow of both the public and private research funds into the universities with the total research 
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funds from all sources increasing from $232.4 million in 1992/1993 to $403.5 million in 
1997/1998. Of this total, the private sector research funding increased from $9.2 million in 
1992/1993 to $18.8 million in 1997/1998, and the government funding for research increased 
from $31.9 million in 1992/1993 to $99.2 million in 1997/1998 (Johnson, 2000).  
By the early 1990s, increasing student numbers brought increasing funding pressure 
that prompted the National Government to establish the Todd Committee to advise on the 
options for public and private funding. The Todd Report, published in 1994, reaffirmed the 
commercial logic and the neo-liberal strategy adopted by the government to manage public 
tertiary institutions (Easton, 1997). Throughout the 1990s, a series of reports continued to 
emphasise market driven approaches to improving the efficiency and accountability of the 
tertiary sector. This clearly reflected the overall trend of the government’s major macro 
policies and the socio-economic reform agenda in which economic rationalism and market 
liberalisation remained the key features. The shift towards market driven entrepreneurship 
was the common trend in tertiary education in most OECD countries (Etzkowitz, Webster, 
Gebhardt, and Terra, 2000; Marginson and Considine, 2000; OECD, 2003; Vincent-Lancrin, 
2006). Neo-liberalism redefined the very purpose of education and research leading to 
‘academic capitalism’ (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Universities driven by a commercial and 
entrepreneurial spirit became commonly known as the ‘Enterprise University’ (Considine and 
Marginson, 2001). According to Codd (2005, p. 194), “successive New Zealand governments 
embraced neo-liberalism as allegedly the only solution to worsening economic conditions”. 
This optimism seems misplaced as neo-liberal strategies and policy directions of the 
government encouraged profit-seeking behaviours that failed to recognise research 
commercialisation as part of a system of innovation that delivered value from research in 
terms of social and economic development in the national interest.  Neo-liberalism introduced 
commercialisation to the New Zealand tertiary sector (Larner and Le Heron, 2005), but the 
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NPM initiatives of the government to bring market discipline to the research environment 
through funding cuts and accounting performance measures, only encouraged individual 
tertiary institution’s to maximise their own revenue streams and profit at the expense of the 
development of a broader commercialisation mission.  
During the 1990s, the “government did not have a strong focus on innovation as part 
of its economic policy approach”, and this lack of initiatives discouraged the tertiary 
institutions’ engagement in academic research commercialisation (OECD, 2007, p. 156). At 
the beginning of the late 1990s, the perceived failings of the neo-liberal strategy started to 
emerge, and the new Labour-Alliance coalition government elected in November 1999 set 
out to change the direction of tertiary education. It appointed the Tertiary Education Advisory 
Commission to set a vision for tertiary education to pave the way for New Zealand to become 
a "world-leading knowledge society" (TEAC, 2000, p. 32).  
Period 2000-2009: An emphasis on innovation and nation building 
In 2000, the government recognised the growing importance of innovation to the 
nation’s economic growth and put innovation at the centre of its economic policy. It 
appointed the Science and Innovation Advisory Council to comprehensively assess and 
advise on the New Zealand innovation system. Since 2000, the government also set the focus 
of the tertiary education system to produce knowledge, skills and innovation to transform the 
economy, promote social and cultural development, and contribute effectively to the 
development of a knowledge nation (TEAC, 2001a). In 2001, the Tertiary Advisory 
Commission released two reports that suggested that the neo-liberal policies were 
incompatible with the need to develop a knowledge society and that the tertiary policy must 
be aligned with important national strategic goals of innovation, and economic and social 
development (TEAC, 2001a, 2001b). Following various reviews and reports on innovation, 
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the government in February 2002 set out its Growth and Innovation Framework with a major 
focus on returning New Zealand’s per capita income to the top half of the OECD rankings 
(New Zealand Government, 2002).  The government established the Growth and Innovation 
Advisory Board in May 2002 to provide it with high level independent strategic advice on 
growth and innovation issues. Among other issues, the advice the government received from 
this board was to recognise the importance of tertiary education research and 
commercialisation as key drivers of modern economies and thriving societies (New Zealand 
Government, 2002). This led to the establishment of the Tertiary Education Commission in 
2003 to help provide strategic direction and formulate research priorities for the tertiary 
organisations. 
Tertiary Education Commission  
To give effect to the government’s vision on research and innovation, the Tertiary 
Education Commission released the first Tertiary Education Strategy 2002-2007 that  
contained a key strategy (strategy six) to strengthen research, knowledge creation and uptake 
for the New Zealand knowledge society (Ministry of Education, 2003). Specific objectives 
relating to this strategy were to encourage and reward excellent research performance 
(objective 29); have a more focused tertiary research investment through world-class clusters 
and networks of specialisation (objective 32); ensure greater alignment of tertiary education 
research with national goals (objective 33); and improve knowledge uptake through stronger 
links with those that apply new knowledge or commercialisation of knowledge products 
(objective 34). Within this strategic framework, the Statement of Tertiary Education Priorities 
were formulated and released by the Minister of Education to give effect to these strategies. 
The views expressed by one government policy advisor during an interview were that “the 
government sees tertiary education as a powerful driver of economic performance. The 
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government is very active in trying to create a framework and an environment which enables 
a transfer of knowledge to occur more readily” (Holmes.C, personal communication, 11 
December, 2007). 
Since 2002, a significant round of reforms began with the enactment of the Tertiary 
Education (Reform) Bill and the launch of the 2002-2007 Tertiary Education Strategy. The 
reforms were aimed at “shifting the attitudes, culture and focus” of the tertiary education 
sector to greater collaboration and rationalisation; more responsiveness to the needs of the 
communities; and ensuring that there is greater alignment with the nation’s economic and 
social development goals (Ministry of Education, 2006b, p. 29). The government recognised 
that it needed to build university-industry-government collaboration that was important for 
research commercialisation. It established centres for research excellence to facilitate this 
partnership more commonly referred to as the ‘triple-helix’ of research commercialisation 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997; 2000). The government also recognised the tertiary 
education sector as a major player in the nation’s innovation system. It established the 
Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) Working Group to set the major strategic 
direction for research in tertiary education. 
Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) 
The PBRF Working Group recommendations revolutionised the tertiary research 
funding system by placing greater emphasis on research quality as a means of funding 
research in tertiary organisations (Ministry of Education, 2002). In the PBRF funding 
formula, 60 percent of research funding is based on research quality, 25 percent is based on 
research degree completions, and 15 per cent is based on external research income. The 
funding allocation for universities through the PBRF commenced in 2004 with $16.3 million 
rising to $201.1 million when it was fully implemented in 2007 (Ministry of Education, 
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2010). During the phase-in period until 2007, the bulk of the research funding continued on 
the basis of student enrolments. Between 2002 and 2008, the total university research income 
rose by 102 percent from $297 million to $600.6 million. The total research contracts income 
rose by 90.3 percent from $194.2 million in 2002 to $369.5 million in 2008 (Ministry of 
Education, 2010). The PBRF Working Group reported that it expected that the PBRF will 
make a major contribution to the development of the nation (Ministry of Education, 2002). 
According to interviewees, PBRF drives the research culture of the tertiary institutions 
mainly because reward systems and funding incentives are tied to PBRF activities. The lack 
of commercialisation incentives is causing a culture clash among academic researchers and 
undermining the research commercialisation development. 
Other government initiatives and concerns  
In March 2006, the government agreed on an Economic Transformation Agenda to 
build on the directions set by the Growth and Innovation Framework for lifting New 
Zealand's innovation and economic performance and improving the income per capita. The 
government continued to develop its tertiary education strategy together with a number of 
science and innovation strategies. The government’s goals for tertiary education as part of the 
Economic Transformation Agenda were to create and apply knowledge to drive innovation, 
improve the transfer and application of knowledge, supply research and knowledge to create 
commercial opportunities for New Zealand firms, connect effectively with businesses to 
realise these opportunities, and build the global awareness and lift productivity and 
innovation (Ministry of Education, 2006a).  
According to a recent OECD report on tertiary education, investment in research and 
development is an important indicator of the effort government is putting into achieving 
scientific and technological progress (OECD, 2008). This report highlights that in GDP 
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terms, tertiary education research and development expenditure increased steadily from 
0.36% to 0.40% across the OECD nations between the period 2000 and 2005, but in New 
Zealand’s case, it declined. The New Zealand government financed research and 
development expenditure is also much lower than the OECD average (MoRST, 2006). There 
are wider concerns that previous government policy settings failed to encourage innovative 
businesses, and historically low investments in both public and private research over many 
decades resulted in the lack of knowledge intensive industry in New Zealand (Gluckman, 
2009). These shortcomings justify renewed calls for the government to fulfil its leadership 
role in the nation’s research and innovation system.   
The government has a major role to provide the policy frameworks for economic 
growth and innovation. Since 2000, it established various science and innovation related 
frameworks and advisory boards aimed at strengthening the innovative efforts of the nation. 
The government sees commercialisation from public research as an important way to create 
benefits for New Zealand and issued guidelines on intellectual property ownership, licensing 
and use. Three key ministries, the Ministry for Research, Science and Technology, the 
Ministry for Economic Development and the Ministry of Education, have pivotal roles in 
setting the research policy direction and funding administration. A number of other 
government policy agencies have important roles, such as the Ministry of Health which is 
involved in formulating health research policy and the Tertiary Education Commission has a 
strategic role in the development of tertiary education policy.  
The government funding for research in the tertiary education sector is provided by the 
Tertiary Education Commission using the PBRF criteria. The Royal Society of New Zealand 
provides basic research funding to the tertiary sector primarily through the Marsden Fund, the 
Health Research Council provides funding for medical research, and the Foundation for 
Research, Science and Technology provides funding for strategic research. These 
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independent authorities are funded by the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology. 
From 2002-2003, the government established seven Centres of Research Excellence to enable 
the development of a critical mass of inter-institutional and world-class research networks to 
help improve knowledge uptake and commercialisation of research. Each Centre of Research 
Excellence is hosted by a university and comprises a number of partner research 
organisations. Innovation related funding provided by the Tertiary Education Commission is 
aimed at improving the links between tertiary institutions, industry and business to help 
develop research capability and knowledge transfer, and encourage private sector investment. 
The government also established the New Zealand Venture Investment Fund Ltd in 2002 to 
address a shortage of venture capital to help facilitate commercialisation of innovation, and 
the Pre Seed Accelerator Fund was established in 2003 to help transform research results 
from publicly funded research into viable commercialisation prospects. 
Although the government’s role has been recognised through the establishment of various 
support programmes and funding mechanisms, there is to some extent, a lack of clarity 
between the roles of the government ministries and between those of their funding agencies 
(OECD, 2007). The Tertiary Education Strategy 2008-2012 highlights concerns that although 
tertiary institutions produce significant amounts of research, there is a low rate of transfer to 
business (Ministry of Education, 2006a). The OECD 2005 Annual Review of New Zealand 
report also highlights the strikingly low rate of collaboration and ideas flowing from 
universities and research institutions to businesses (OECD, 2005). It seems that misdirected 
government research agendas and funding policies combined with a lack of a coherent long-
term national strategy discouraged the development of academic research commercialisation. 
The government, therefore, needs to urgently address these concerns to enhance research 
commercialisation opportunities from tertiary institutions.  
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Emphasis on accounting and accountability 
In the period 2000-2009, major changes to the government policy and research 
funding mainly through the implementation of the PBRF placed greater emphasis on 
accountability for research performance. The access to research funding became more 
competitive than in the past, and increasing proportions of available funds provided by 
government agencies were targeted for specific research purposes. As research and 
development remain significant spending categories in government budgets, the tertiary 
institutions are subject to greater public scrutiny due to concerns of public accountability. The 
allocation of public research funding has become increasingly characterised by research 
priority areas and outcomes, competitive bidding, and performance-based funding. The role 
of accounting with a strong technical dimension expanded to incorporate NPM measures of 
research performance, and reporting of results became highly institutionalised in terms of the 
PBRF criteria of income generation. The research commercialisation agenda of tertiary 
institutions place high priority on funding, budgeting, costing and pricing issues. Institutional 
accounting systems and procedures are designed to facilitate accounting for research income 
and expenditure at individual school and project level, as well as allow for research 
budgeting, cost management and contract pricing.  
The tertiary organisations, as autonomous institutions, have the freedom to pursue self 
determined institutional objectives, but at the same time as public funded institutions, they 
are under increasing public pressure to utilise the outcomes of their research for the benefit of 
society. According to the OECD, the tension between the pursuit of self-determined 
institutional objectives and the broader research commercialisation objectives of the nation 
needs to be recognised and reconciled with an increasing focus on accountability and 
performance (OECD, 2008). The growing accountability demands emerging from the social 
and institutional contexts coerced the tertiary institutions into utilising positive reporting 
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strategies to enhance their research reputation and public image. The strategic documents and 
annual reports of tertiary institutions largely imitate and represent the social and economic 
priorities of the nation to provide legitimacy and help obtain government funding. Hence, 
modern accounting comprising the social and economic agenda, institutionalised performance 
measures, and positive reporting narratives, is increasingly relied upon to create visibility and 
convey symbolic meanings (Miller, 1994). It helps transform and shape tertiary 
organisational activities and social interactions beyond its technical dimension (Hopwood, 
1990).  
Summary  
This historical study examined over three decades of initiatives utilised by the New 
Zealand government to encourage the development of academic research commercialisation. 
The study explains how accounting was implicated within the context of academic research 
commercialisation development. The period up until the early 1990s was marked by the 
institutional transformation of the DSIR, New Zealand’s largest state research organisation, 
to a new ‘commercial model’ based on the user pays policy. The government policy took a 
view that it should not be funding or subsidising research of direct commercial value. 
Accounting largely depicted by budget formulation was used successfully for research policy 
and planning, allocating research funds, and maintaining an overall coherence of the national 
research priorities.  The role of accounting expanded to include costing and pricing models 
with the introduction of the user pays policy for research. The technical characteristics of 
accountability in terms of neutrality, objectivity, calculability, and usefulness for decision-
making made it widely acceptable. In the tertiary education sector, the Hawke Report was the 
significant starting point in the debate in the commercialisation process. In 1988, funding 
pressures led to the establishment of the first university commercial company to pursue the 
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commercialisation agenda, but the government was not proactive in leading any 
developments in the commercialisation of academic research. 
The period 1990-1999 saw the implementation of the neo-liberal policies of the 
government in the tertiary education sector. This was a period of intense competition as 
tertiary institutions had the freedom to generate private sources of revenue. Significant 
accounting changes such as course costing and pricing models, programme budgeting and 
enhanced financial reporting systems were implemented within tertiary institutions. The 
technical role of accounting expanded to include an understanding of overhead allocation and 
full cost recovery models in pricing of research projects. Major public sector accounting 
changes were implemented resulting in the financial statements remodelled in terms of 
statements of objectives and statements of service performance. The annual reports became 
the key accountability document for reporting to the government and other stakeholders on 
research performance. Clearly, accounting was used as an intervening device to exert 
influence through greater reliance on its technical characteristics to assist the tertiary 
organisations’ functioning. It also helped permeate the ways in which research priorities, 
funding concerns, and new possibilities for action were expressed (Hopwood, 1990). During 
this period, the shift towards market driven entrepreneurship was a common trend, and 
tertiary institutions were strategically positioning themselves, restructuring, and establishing 
new organisational forms to take full advantage of the commercial opportunities presented by 
the market. Although teaching and research was separated with research funding becoming 
more contestable, the government initiatives failed to encourage the development of 
commercialisation of academic research. It was not until the end of 1999 that the full impact 
of the failings of government’s neo-liberal strategy was realised.  
In 2000, the government put innovation at the centre of its economic policy and 
recognised tertiary education as making an important contribution to the innovation and 
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development plans of the nation. The Tertiary Education Strategy 2002-2007 document 
clearly laid out the government’s intent on academic research and recognised 
commercialisation as an important function. The government established Centres of Research 
Excellence to encourage greater collaboration with industry and implemented PBRF to 
reward research excellence in tertiary institutions. However, the PBRF failed to recognise and 
fund commercialisation of academic research making it a marginal activity in most tertiary 
institutions. Since 2000, the growing accountability demands expanded the role of accounting 
in tertiary institutions to incorporate measures of research performance and reporting of 
results. The social and institutional environment pressures influenced accounting to utilise 
positive reporting strategies to represent and imitate the government’s research priorities. The 
annual report constructed as a positive narrative of research performance has become a key 
accounting mechanism to create visibility, help provide legitimacy and secure government 
funding. In this manner, accounting is increasingly relied upon as a social practice with 
symbolic meanings to help construct social reality (Carnegie and Napier, 1996; Miller, 1994; 
Potter, 2005). However, implicating accounting to push the government’s political agenda 
has not influenced research commercialisation development in tertiary institutions. 
Conclusion  
The academic research commercialisation development has been marked by a history 
of misdirected government research agendas and funding policies resulting in a lack of a 
coherent national strategy on innovation and commercialisation. Previous government 
policies have been deficient in encouraging academic research commercialisation, and it was 
not until 2002 that government formally endorsed commercialisation as a vital activity and 
put it on its national policy agenda. It seems that after the NPM reforms of the 1990’s, the 
incoming Labour government directed funds away from the market place and the needs of the 
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New Zealand industry and enterprises which largely contributed to the nation’s poor OECD 
rankings. The government’s message to researchers was to do more with the same or less 
funding with the prevailing view that putting strategies and policies in place was generally 
sufficient to encourage research commercialisation. Even under the current PBRF policy 
initiatives, it is not mandatory for tertiary institutions to engage in commercialisation of 
academic research. It seems that the government has been too complacent about its policy 
initiatives which contributed to previous low levels of academic research commercialisation.  
There are a number of important lessons to be learnt from the New Zealand 
experience. First, commercialisation calls for a long-term national strategy that is coherent, 
responsive and promises results. Second, academic research needs to be seen in terms of 
economic contributions and value-adding activities leading to commercial outcomes. Third, 
to ensure that research projects work towards an avenue of commercialisation, government 
policy needs to tie funding to the commercialisation potential of research activities. Fourth, 
commercialisation projects are long-term, uncertain and complex, and present considerable 
risks. The government initiatives need to recognise the entire value chain, beginning from the 
basic research to discovery and exploitation. Fifth, specific research grants need to be 
established and conditioned on tertiary organisations demonstrating that they are able to 
advance their research and innovation into the commercial market. Finally, recognising the 
pervasive and enabling characteristics of accounting will help facilitate research 
commercialisation development.    
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